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NSC BRIEFING

8 November 1954

NEHRU'S CHINA TRIP

I. Nehru and Indian press cautious at time of departure.  
25X1X7

A. [REDACTED] Nehru worried about appearances,  
"determined" not to permit Communist propaganda capitalize  
visit.

B. Indian press, possibly government inspired, almost  
<sup>one</sup>unanimously asked China furnish concrete evidence "peaceful  
intentions" in Far East.

C. This first time such demand widely made of China, instead  
of West.

II. In China, Nehru got tremendous demonstrations, heavy press  
coverage.

A. Outdid that given top Soviet leaders.

B. Some evidence Indians impressed by "spontaneity" of  
demonstrations, despite recognition staging.

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III. Effect on Nehru and his party apparently different from that desired, however.

A. Chinese leaders, except Chou, described as "rather doctrinaire and rigid."

B. Impression of China's strength and unity frightened Indians, made them realize India would be weaker partner in any firm relationship.

C. Nehru likely to be even more cautious than before in China dealings.

D. Nehru emphasized, after return, that India and China had different ways of accomplishing same basic ends.

IV. Major result of trip likely to be in relations with Indochina.

A. Nehru has hardened his thinking on spheres of influence, decided Laos and Cambodia lie in Indian sphere.

B. Nehru told Ho Chi Minh that if Communists seek to extend present holdings in Southeast Asia, they will "run into trouble."

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C. This may lead to early recognition of Cambodia, although recognition of Laos and Vietnam will be delayed.

D. India may in future look more closely at Viet Minh actions and intentions in Indochina.

1. Reports from Indian members of International Control Commission may be scrutinized with more objective eye than before.

V. Conclusions:

A. India's foreign policy unlikely to show major outward changes in near future.

B. However, Nehru's increased respect for China's strength, in comparison India, almost certain to work in favor of West.

1. Greater suspicion of Chinese activities along Himalayan borders.

2. Somewhat lessened criticism of West and its actions.

3. More favorable attitude toward Western aid for India's industrialization.